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I. INTRODUCTION
Proving that a dynamical system is chaotic is an important problem in chaos theory1. De-
spite causality2, virtually any “interesting” question about non-trivial dynamical systems ap-
pears to be undecidable3, but is there a way to mathematically prove this statement? Closely
related is the question: Is there a way to measure the difficulty of proving the chaoticity of
a dynamical system? There are only few “bridges” between chaotic dynamical systems and
complexity theories, in particular algorithmic information theory4–7. The unpredictability
of the systems studied in this article comes from a combination of chaoticity and a “decision
problem” embedded in the system; the complexity of the “decision problem” (in the sense
to be precisely described in the following section) may be arbitrarily large, including high
incomputability. We shall show that “proving the chaoticity of some dynamical systems”
amounts to “solving the hardest problems in mathematics” and vice versa.
We will study a class of mathematical sentences called Π1–statements. A sentence of the
form pi = ∀nPred(n), where Pred is a computable predicate (n is always a non-negative
integer) is called a Π1–statement. The Greek letter pi is used as a generic notation for
such a statement; it has no relation with the famous constant 3.145 · · ·. Clearly, pi is true
if and only if all instances of Pred, Pred(0),Pred(1), . . . ,Pred(n), . . . are true. Every Π1–
statement is finitely refutable because a single false instance of Pred makes pi false. For
example, ∀n[n2 + 1 > 0] is true, but ∀n[2n + 3 is prime] is false.
We deal with formal proofs by using the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of
Choice (ZFC), the standard system for doing mathematics. So, we say that “ZFC proves
pi” in case there is a proof in ZFC for pi.
Da Costa, Doria8 and da Costa, Doria and Amaral9 have constructed a two-dimensional
Hamiltonian system H — a system of first-order differential equations which can be written
in the form of Hamilton’s equations, in which the Hamiltonian function represents the total
energy of the system — with the property that (formally) proving the existence of a Smale
horseshoe in H is equivalent to (formally) proving Fermat’s last theorem. Contrary to the
opinion expressed in the above articles, it was shown that proving that the two-dimensional
Hamiltonian system H has a Smale horseshoe has low complexity10 because Fermat’s last
theorem has a low complexity.
As Fermat’s last theorem is a Π1–statement, it is natural to ask whether the above results
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can be extended to any Π1–statement. In this note we show that to every Π1–statement
pi one can associate a dynamical system Hpi such that proving in ZFC the chaoticity of
Hpi is equivalent to proving pi in ZFC. By applying the computational method
11–13 to Π1–
statements we show that there are dynamical systems whose ZFC proofs of their chaoticity
are arbitrarily complex and there are chaotic systems for which ZFC cannot prove their
chaoticity. The techniques are related to (i) the construction of a Poincare´ box as a classical
physical random number generator (akin to a quantum Born box), and (ii) the conceivable
capability of classical physical systems to “compute the hard or even the incomputable”
by measuring observables which correspond to computationally hard or even incomputable
problems.
II. Π1–STATEMENTS AND THE COMPLEXITY MEASURE
In this section we present a complexity measure11–13 for Π1–statements defined by means
of register machine programs.
We use a fixed “universal formalism” for programs, more precisely, a universal self-
delimiting Turing machine U . The machine U (which is fully described below) has to be
minimal in the sense that none of its instructions can be simulated by a program for U
written with the remaining instructions.
To every Π1–statement pi = ∀mPred(m) we associate the algorithm ΠPred = inf{n :
Pred(n) = false} which systematically searches for a counter-example for pi. There are
many programs (for U) which implement ΠPred; without loss of generality, any such program
will be denoted also by ΠPred. Note that pi is true iff U(ΠPred) never halts.
The complexity (with respect to U) of a Π1–statement pi is defined by the length of
the smallest-length program (for U) ΠPred—defined as above—where minimization is calcu-
lated for all possible representations of pi as pi = ∀nPred(n): CU(pi) = min{|ΠPred| : pi =
∀nPred(n)}.
For CU it is irrelevant whether pi is known to be true or false. In particular, the
program containing the single instruction halt is not a ΠPred program, for any Pred.
As the exact value of CU is not important (CU is incomputable), following a previ-
ous article by two of the Authors13 we classify Π1–statements into the following classes:
CU,n = {pi : pi is a Π1–statement, CU(pi) ≤ n kbit}. (Recall that a kilobit (kbit or kb) is
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equal to 210 bits.)
We briefly describe the syntax and the semantics of a register machine language which
implements a (natural) minimal universal prefix-free binary Turing machine U . Any register
program (machine) uses a finite number of registers, each of which may contain an arbitrarily
large non-negative integer. By default, all registers, named with a string of lower or upper
case letters, are initialized to 0. Instructions are labeled by default with 0,1,2,. . .
The register machine instructions are listed below. Note that in all cases R2 and R3
denote either a register or a non-negative integer, while R1 must be a register. When
referring to R we use, depending upon the context, either the name of register R or the
non-negative integer stored in R.
=R1,R2,R3: if the contents of R1 and R2 are equal, then the execution continues at the
R3-th instruction of the program; if the contents of R1 and R2 are not equal, then execution
continues with the next instruction in sequence, and, if the content of R3 is outside the
scope of the program, then we have an illegal branch error.
&R1,R2: the contents of register R1 is replaced by R2.
+R1,R2: the contents of register R1 is replaced by the sum of the contents of R1 and
R2.
!R1: one bit is read into the register R1, so the contents of R1 becomes either 0 or 1;
any attempt to read past the last data-bit results in a run-time error.
%: this is the last instruction for each register machine program before the input data;
it halts the execution in two possible states: either successfully halts or it halts with an
under-read error.
A register machine program consists of a finite list of labeled instructions from the above
list, with the restriction that the halt instruction appears only once, as the last instruction
of the list.
To compute an upper bound on the complexity of a Π1–statement pi we need to compute
the size in bits of the program Πpi, so we need to uniquely code in binary the programs for
U . To this aim we use a prefix-free coding as follows.
Table I enumerates the binary coding of special characters. For registers we use the
prefix-free regular code code1 = {0
|x|1x | x ∈ {0, 1}∗}. The register names are chosen to
optimize the length of the program, i.e. the most frequent registers have the smallest code1
length.
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TABLE I. Binary encoding of special characters (instructions and comma); ε is the empty string.
special characters code instruction code
, ε + 111
& 01 ! 110
= 00 % 100
For non-negative integers we use the prefix-free regular code code2 = {1
|x|0x | x ∈
{0, 1}∗}. The instructions are coded by self-delimiting binary strings as follows (see more
details in Refs.11–13):
(i) &R1,R2 is coded in two different ways, depending on R2 (we omit ε):
01code1(R1)codei(R2), where i = 1 if R2 is a register and i = 2 if R2 is a non-negative
integer.
(ii) +R1,R2 is coded in two different ways depending on R2: 111code1(R1)codei(R2), where
i = 1 if R2 is a register and i = 2 if R2 is a non-negative integer.
(iii) =R1,R2,R3 is coded in four different ways depending on the data types of R2 and R3:
00code1(R1)codei(R2)codej(R3), where i = 1 if R2 is a register and i = 2 if R2 is a
non-negative integer, j = 1 if R3 is a register and j = 2 if R3 is a non-negative integer.
(iv) !R1 is coded by 110code1(R1).
(v) % is coded by 100.
For example, Goldbach’s conjecture (included in Hilbert’s eighth problem14) states that
all positive even integers greater than two can be expressed as the sum of two primes. The
program ΠGoldbach listed in Table II gives the upper bound CU(Goldbach) ≤ 540 which
proves that the Goldbach conjecture is in the lowest class CU,1.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We start with a result relating Π1–statements and Hamiltonians.
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00: = a a 16 11: & d 0 22: = d 0 35 33: + g 2
01: & e 2 12: = a a 6 23: & i 0 34: = a a 17
02: & d 1 13: = d 0 c 24: & k h 35: + h 1
03: = a e c 14: + e 1 25: = k g 29 36: = a a 18
04: & d 0 15: = a a 2 26: + i 1 37: & d 0
05: & f e 16: & g 4 27: + k 1 38: %
06: = f a 13 17: & h 2 28: = a a 25
07: + f 1 18: = g h 38 29: & c 32
08: + d 1 19: & c 22 30: & a i
09: = d e 11 20: & a h 31: = a a 1
10: = a a 6 21: = a a 1 32: = d 0 35
TABLE II. Program ΠGoldbach for the Goldbach conjecture.
Theorem 1 Assume ZFC is arithmetically sound, i.e. every statement ZFC proves is true.
Then, to each Π1–statement pi = ∀mPred(m) one can effectively construct in the formal
language of ZFC a Hamiltonian system Hpi such that ZFC proves that the system Hpi has a
Smale horseshoe iff ZFC proves pi.
We denote by h and k the Hamiltonian for the two-dimensional system with a Smale
horseshoe as defined by Holmes and Marsden15 (their Example 4) and the Hamiltonian for
the free particle, respectively. Clearly, the systems h and k can be represented in the formal
language of ZFC. Define the Hamiltonian Hmpi as a linear combination of h, k:
Hmpi (q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) = Pred(m) · h(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) (1)
+(1− Pred(m)) · k(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn).
Fix a positive integer i. In view of (1), Hipi can be represented in the formal language of
ZFC and Hipi(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) = h(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) iff ZFC proves pi. In case the
above equivalence holds true, Hipi(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) = H
j
pi(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn), for all
non-negative integers i, j, hence we can name each Htpi by Hpi.
We have shown that
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ZFC proves pi iff ZFC proves that Hpi has a Smale horseshoe,
hence ending the proof of Theorem 1.
If pi is true but unprovable in ZFC, then the equality Hipi(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) =
h(q1, . . . , qn, p1, . . . , pn) is true but unprovable in ZFC.
In case pi is the Fermat’s last theorem, Theorem 1 is exactly the result proved8,9; our
direct proof does not need the machinery involving Richardson lemma used in Ref.8,9.
Theorem 1 can be applied to a variety of Π1–statements including Goldbach’s conjecture,
Riemann’s hypothesis, the four color theorem, and many others.
We address now the complexity issue: How difficult is it to prove in ZFC that the system
Hpi in Equation (1) is chaotic? Using the complexity CU we can show that Fermat’s last
theorem and Goldbach’s conjecture are in CU,1, the Riemann hypothesis is in CU,3, and the
four color theorem is in CU,4
13,16,17; their corresponding dynamical systems produced by The-
orem 1 have the property that the complexity of its chaoticity proof is in the corresponding
class.
As for every natural n there exists a natural mn such that CU,n ⊂ CU,mn , it follows that,
according to CU , there exist arbitrarily complex Π1–statements; hence proving the chaoticity
of the system Hpi can be arbitrarily complex.
Finally, there are infinitely many true, but unprovable in ZFC, Π1–statements pi
18, such
that the corresponding systemsHipi are chaotic but ZFC cannot prove their chaoticity. For ex-
ample, from the negation of the halting problem for U we get infinitely many Π1-statements
pix = “∀n (U(x) does not stop in time n)” which are undecidable in ZFC.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF CHAOTIC MOTION
One of the intriguing possibilities of the aforementioned equivalences between certain
statements in ZFC and chaotic motion is the hypothetical possibility to “decide” hard prob-
lems in ZFC or “perform incomputable tasks” by observing the corresponding chaos3,9,19–21.
Indeed, if such methods and procedures have an “effective” physical implementation, then,
strictly speaking, the Church-Turing thesis identifying the informal notion of computable
algorithm with Turing computability, or, equivalently, recursive functions, is too restricted
and has to be adapted to the physical capacities22–24 (for a converse viewpoint restricting
operations to strictly finitistic means, see Refs.25–27).
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It is rather intriguing that, at least in this respect, the situation resembles the famous
Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (EPR) argument28 for a possible “incompleteness” of quantum
mechanics. According to EPR, whereas quantum theory does not allow complementary
physical observables to simultaneously “exist,” experiment (augmented with counterfactual
reasoning) allows for such “elements of physical reality.”
In the case of chaotic systems, our present theory of computability, formalized by recursion
theory, does not allow the “execution” of certain “hard” tasks; but the equivalent chaotic
systems would perform just such tasks, sometimes with relative ease on the side of the
experimenter. One example of such seemingly mismatch — in the sense of EPR — of
computability theory and physical computation is the construction of “oracles producing
random bits,” as discussed in the next section.
V. POINCARE´ BOX AS PHYSICAL RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR
Chaotic systems can be used as a physical device for incomputability. In the “extreme”
algorithmically incompressible case, a chaotic dynamical system can serve as a source of
random bits; i.e., as a physical random number generator (RNG). This RNG can be con-
ceptualized by enclosing a chaotic system in a “black box” with an output interface which
communicates the consecutive physical states of the chaotic evolution29 in a properly en-
coded symbolic form. In order for these, say, strings of bits, to be physically certified random,
it is necessary to ascertain chaoticity; a property which relates to the proofs of chaoticity
discussed above.
This scenario can be elucidated by considering the shift map σ (a form of generalized
shift studied by Moore6) which “pushes” up successive bits of the sequence s = 0.s1s2s3 · · ·;
i.e., σ(s) = 0.s2s3s4 · · ·, σ(σ(s)) = 0.s3s4s5 · · ·, and so on. Suppose one starts with an initial
“measurement” precision of, say, just one bit after the comma, indicated by a “window of
measurability;” all other information “beyond the first bit after the comma” is hidden to
the experimenter at this point. Consider an initial state represented by an algorithmically
random real s. At first the experimenter records the first position s1 of s, symbolized by
0.[[s1]]s2s3 · · ·, where the square brackets “[[ · · · ]]” indicate the boundaries of the exper-
imenter’s sliding “window of measurability.” Successive iterations of the shift map “bring
up” more and more bits of the initial sequence of s; i.e., σ(s) yields 0.s1[[s2]]s3s4 · · ·, σ(σ(s))
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yields 0.s1s2[[s3]]s4s5 · · ·, and in general σ
(i)(s) yields 0. · · · si−1si[[si+1]]si+2si+3 · · · after i
iterations of the shift map. Thus effectively, the algorithmic information content of s “un-
folds” at a rate of one bit per time cycle. If s is algorithmically random, then (at least
ideally) the empirical recording of its successive bits generates a random sequence (in the
asymptotic limit).
It is not totally unreasonable to conjecture that, with respect to algorithmic (hence also
statistical) tests of randomness, Poincare´ boxes cannot be differentiated from another type
of physical RNGs termed Born boxes, which are based on quantum indeterminism (e.g.,
photons impinging on beam splitters and detectors30–37). Considering the different physi-
cal origins of physical indeterminism exploited by the Poincare´ and Born boxes — in the
first, classical case, indeterminism resides in the continuum, whereas in the second, quantum
case, in the postulated38–41 irreducible randomness of certain individual outcomes involving
photons — why should the two physical RNG’s perform equally from an algorithmic infor-
mation theoretic42,43 point of view? Because, one could argue, both would produce (in the
asymptotic regime) random strings with high probability.
The Poincare box derives its random behavior from a single, individual initial value
containing incompressible algorithmic information with probability one4,5, whereas the Born
box utilizes successive, independent ideal coin tosses. Whether or not these speculations are
justified or not only experiment can tell. So far, no empirical evidence either for or against
the conjectured equivalence of Poincare´ and Born boxes exist.
It is not too difficult to “construct” a Poincare´ box by utilizing a shift map which “pumps”
up the bits of the binary representation of the initial value by one bit per (discrete iteration)
cycle. Of course, assuring the physical representability of this extreme chaotic regime for
concrete classical chaotic systems, might turn out to be a “hard” task; as has been argued
above. With this proviso, and by further assuming that the initial value is some element
of the continuum (in ZFC the “selection” of an initial value is guaranteed by the Axiom of
Choice), the shift map is, at least asymptotically, capable of yielding a random number with
probability one.
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VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We have argued that every Π1–statement pi can be associated with a dynamical systemHpi
such that ZFC proves the chaoticity of Hpi iff ZFC proves pi. Many “hard”problems, such as,
for example, the Riemann hypothesis and the four color theorem, are Π1–statements. The
computational method11–13 has been applied to Π1–statements, resulting in a complexity
measure for proving the chaoticity of some dynamical systems. Consequently, there are
dynamical systems for which the ZFC proofs of their chaoticity are arbitrarily complex
according to the above complexity measure. Furthermore, there are infinitely many chaotic
systems for which ZFC cannot prove their chaoticity.
One of the challenging conceptual questions which is motivated by these results is the
issue of relating physical entities to formal ones. In particular at stake is the Church-
Turing thesis, which is challenged from a classical physical perspective. As classical chaotic
motion seems to be capable to “perform” incomputable tasks — a criterion which might,
as we argue, be “hard” to certify for a wide variety of Hamiltonian systems, but which
nevertheless is a feasible scenario — it might not be too unreasonable to speculate that the
present formal theories of computability would have to be adapted in accordance with our
physical capabilities originating from chaotic motion.
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